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Abstract 
This paper examines the effect of inflation on productivity growth in Australia. 
Broad historical correlations suggest a negative relationship between inflation and 
aggregate productivity growth. The low-frequency nature of the relationship, 
however, means it is difficult to establish statistical causation at the aggregate 
level. We look at the industry-level relationships in an effort to overcome this 
limitation and to understand the relationship better. On this level we find clearly 
significant results with industry-level inflation explaining industry productivity. 
We also find that the relationship varies by industry, with the strongest evidence of 
a negative relationship being found in the cases of concentrated industries, i.e., 
those dominated by large firms. Finally, we find evidence that the negative effects 
of inflation on productivity do not operate solely through a reduction in capital 
accumulation but also through a reduction in multifactor productivity growth. 
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PRODUCTIVITY AND INFLATION 
Tim Bulman and John Simon 
1.  Introduction 
That inflation has costs is widely accepted. What is less clear is the path by which 
inflation generates these costs – there are many alternative theories. The interaction 
of inflation with the tax system, the reduction in the value of the price mechanism, 
the diversion of resources from productive activities to managing inflation, or even 
the cost of adjusting prices on menus have all been posited as costs of high 
inflation.1 However, quantifying these channels empirically is much harder than 
describing them theoretically. Regardless, whatever the channel of effect, they 
must all ultimately reduce output. And inflation’s negative effect on output is most 
likely to be reflected in lower productivity growth.2 Consequently, in considering 
the costs of inflation, the relationship between inflation and productivity is key. 
This paper investigates this relationship without attempting to isolate the strength 
of any particular channel. Notwithstanding this, our results suggest something 
about the characteristics of the channel and we discuss these in some detail later in 
the paper. 
At the simplest level, broad historical correlations suggest a negative relationship 
between productivity and inflation (Table 1). Most OECD countries had low 
productivity growth and high inflation in the 1970s and, to a lesser extent, the 
1980s. Productivity growth then generally increased through the 1990s at the same 
time as inflation generally fell. 
                                           
1  See Blanchard and Fisher (1989) for a discussion of how nominal rigidities affect various 
economic models. 
2  Productivity is that component of output unrelated to changes in the amount of capital and 
labour inputs. While inflation may affect the accumulation of labour and capital it is most 
likely that its major effect will be to impede the efficiency of their organisation – hence 
lowering productivity. We address the possibility that inflation affects the accumulation of 
capital by looking at the difference between labour productivity and multifactor productivity: 
see especially Section 7.1. 2 
 
Table 1: OECD Productivity and Inflation Experiences 
Average annual percentage change in consumer price index 
and GDP per employed person 
   1970–1973 1973–1979 1979–1989 1989–1999 
CPI 6.3  11.4  7.9  3.0  Australia 
Productivity   1.8  1.9  1.0  2.2 
CPI 4.6  9.0  6.8  2.4  Canada 
Productivity   2.6  0.6  0.9  1.1 
CPI 7.1  10.5  7.1  2.4  Denmark 
Productivity   2.7  1.2  0.7  1.8 
CPI 6.2  10.2  7.7  2.1  France 
Productivity   4.0  2.4  2.2  1.3 
CPI 5.3  5.0  3.0  –  Germany 
Productivity   3.4  2.7  1.5  – 
CPI 6.6  15.6  11.7  4.4  Italy 
Productivity   4.1  2.6  2.0  1.7 
CPI 7.6  10.3  2.7  1.3  Japan 
Productivity   5.8  2.8  2.6  1.1 
CPI 11.1  15.8  9.3  5.7  Korea 
Productivity   4.0  4.7  4.8  4.6 
CPI 6.8  7.4  3.0  2.2  Netherlands 
Productivity   4.2  2.1  –0.3 0.6 
CPI 8.0  13.0  12.0  2.0  New Zealand 
Productivity   3.6  –1.6 0.5  0.6 
CPI 7.9  8.5  6.0  2.6  Norway 
Productivity   1.8  2.6  1.9  2.3 
CPI 6.8  9.3  7.9  3.8  Sweden 
Productivity   2.2  0.5  1.4  2.5 
CPI 6.4  4.7  3.3  2.4  Switzerland 
Productivity   2.0  0.6  0.3  0.5 
CPI 8.1  14.4  7.6  4.0  UK 
Productivity   3.8  1.3  1.9  1.7 
CPI 4.9  8.2  6.1  3.2  US 
Productivity   2.3  0.6  1.2  1.7 
Sources:   CPI inflation – IMF; real GDP per person employed – OECD 3 
 
 
The duration of these OECD fluctuations suggests a long-term, low-frequency 
relationship between inflation and productivity, however, this makes it difficult to 
establish statistical causation. To address this problem, this paper focuses on 
industry-level data. Industry-level data offer a number of potential benefits over 
aggregate data. Because each industry is different there is much more variation in 
the data, which in turns brings greater statistical power. Also, we suspect that 
industry-level characteristics may affect the nature of the relationship. Thus, the 
industry-level results are interesting in their own right. 
2.  Theoretical Preamble 
The simplest models in macroeconomics generally assume that nominal and real 
variables are unrelated in the long run. ‘Inflation is always and everywhere a 
monetary phenomenon’ (Friedman 1956, p  4); productivity is a purely real 
occurrence. But upon reflection, we may reasonably think that inflation – or at the 
least, things associated with it – must matter for firms’ ability to improve their 
productivity, for example. And in an effort to better model the behaviour of actual 
economies, much economic research has been directed at investigating the real 
effects of nominal fluctuations. This section discusses some possible explanations 
for the nexus. 
In considering a link between inflation and productivity there are two possible 
causal directions: productivity affects inflation or inflation affects productivity. 
The first generally has higher productivity allowing cost reductions that flow 
through to product prices and thereby reduce inflation. Higher productivity growth 
thus represents a positive supply shock that lowers inflationary pressures. 
The second effect posits that inflation affects productivity growth. From first 
principles, prices matter because they are a highly efficient means of transmitting 
the myriad of individual demand and supply decisions that occur throughout the 
economy.3 In an inflationary environment, the price mechanism loses its 
efficiency. It seems plausible then, that when prices are changing frequently, firms 
may find it more difficult to distinguish an increase in the relative scarcity of their 
                                           
3  An insight best expressed by Hayek (1945). 4 
 
inputs from an across-the-board increase in prices. This may cause firms to direct 
resources previously devoted to research and development, and organisational and 
managerial improvements, towards making basic decisions about optimal input 
allocations and the price of outputs. Similarly, the reduced certainty brought about 
by inflation increases the risk of entrepreneurial errors and would potentially 
induce lower levels of investment. This would all lower the overall productivity of 
the firm. 
There are also arguments based on the interaction of the tax system with higher 
inflation. During periods of high inflation the tax system distorts incentives 
through its treatment of depreciation and capital gains. These distortions are also 
likely to have negative effects on productivity.4 
3.  Previous Research 
Early research into the inflation-productivity nexus was stimulated by the 
experience of high inflation of the 1970s and the subsequent fall in productivity 
growth. Most of the literature has debated the statistical question of whether the 
data support any relationship, and if so, the causal direction. Minimal work 
explores the theoretical side, or how inflation may be transmitted into slower 
productivity growth and vice versa. By country, a range of literature examines the 
relationship in the G7 economies, but we are aware of no comprehensive and 
conclusive recent Australian study of the inflation-productivity relationship. 
Further, all these studies only observe the relationship at the aggregate level 
without gaining from potential industry-specific insights. Notwithstanding this, we 
glean some useful points from what’s gone before. (Table 2 summarises the 
literature’s findings.) 
                                           
4 See, e.g., the papers cited by Jarrett and Selody (1982, p  362); also, Freeman and 
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The early view was a little circumspect about the nature of any relationship 
between productivity growth and inflation. Nonetheless, both Keynesian and neo-
classical theory (e.g., Lucas’s (1973) simple model of an output-inflation trade-off) 
suggest a negative relationship. Into this context, the earliest papers sought to 
reconcile the observed North American acceleration in inflation and following 
decline in productivity growth. Jarret and Selody (1982) proposed two rationales 
for this occurrence: that the tax system’s lack of neutrality during periods of 
inflation increases the private sector’s tax burden,5 and that inflation’s increasing 
variance with higher levels of inflation would cause sub-optimal resource 
allocations and increase the probability of ‘entrepreneurial error’, hence reducing 
investment. Using 1963–1979 Canadian data, Jarret and Selody found a 
bi-directional relationship, with the rise in inflation explaining nearly the entire 
slowdown in productivity growth. US data over the period 1948–1981 demonstrate 
a similar correlation, with causation running one-way from higher inflation to 
slower productivity growth (Clark 1982).6 Methodologically, these studies apply 
Granger-type causality tests to OLS (Clark 1982; Ram 1984) or Full Information 
Maximum Likelihood (Jarret and Selody 1982) estimations. 
A second group of papers took up the debate in the mid 1990s. These had the 
advantage of being able to observe the productivity growth-inflation relationship 
after the 1980s’ disinflation, and also draw on the experience of a wider range of 
G7 economies. They are more equivocal about the existence of any relationship. 
A further group of papers is sceptical of any inflation-productivity growth 
relationship. These papers take two tacks. One approach is to argue that the results 
show that the business cycle drives simultaneous variations in both productivity 
growth and inflation, not a long-run relationship.7 The stylised facts have 
productivity growth peaking ahead of the business cycle, with inflation then 
accelerating. In response, the monetary authorities increase interest rates, thus 
slowing output growth hence productivity growth through the effects of labour 
hoarding. Inflation’s slow-down lags that of the real economy. Thus, an 
appropriate model of the productivity growth-inflation relationship must absorb the 
                                           
5   See, e.g., Feldstein (1982a, 1982b). 
6  Ram (1984) reaches the same conclusion, using a CPI-based measure of inflation. 
7  E.g., Sbordone and Kuttner (1994); Freeman and Yerger (2000). 8 
 
business cycle through variables such as real interest rates, the output gap, or 
variations in GDP growth. 
The other critique argues the statistical point that productivity growth and inflation 
have different orders of integration.8 These studies claim inflation is non-stationary 
while productivity growth is stationary, and therefore there cannot be a long-run 
relationship. Statistically speaking, this seems a not unreasonable complaint. 
Nonetheless, there is much debate about whether inflation is better characterised as 
an I(1) process or as stationary around a broken trend. For example, Hendry (2001) 
finds that UK inflation is best characterised as I(0) but non-stationary due to 
regime breaks over a very long sample. If this is the case, the observation that one 
cannot reject that inflation is I(1) over a particular sample does not necessarily lead 
to the conclusion that it could not possibly be related to productivity growth.9 
In summary, we take several points from the literature. Methodologically, the 
literature is uniform in its approach. Almost all the papers run Granger causality 
tests, or a close relative, VAR models. Second, there does appear to be a 
relationship between productivity growth and inflation, and, where it is 
determinable, the causality appears to flow from inflation to productivity growth. 
Third, two pitfalls are to be avoided: ignoring the macroeconomic context of the 
inflation-productivity growth relationship; and ignoring the statistical issues of 
correlating series with potentially different orders of integration. A final point is 
that we could find no comprehensive and satisfactory Australian study of the 
inflation-productivity growth relationship. Our study addresses this gap. 
4.  Methodology and Data 
The correlation apparent in the relationship between Australian aggregate inflation 
and productivity growth in Table 1 can be tested econometrically, using annual 
data. It is marginally statistically significant – as mentioned in the introduction. 
This may be for many reasons but two are most important: 1) we only have 36 
                                           
8  E.g., Sbordone and Kuttner (1994); Cameron et al (1996); Freeman and Yerger (2000); 
Tsionas (2003). 
9  Hall (1999) argues emphatically that inflation should be treated as mean-reverting, even if it 
may statistically appear otherwise. 9 
 
annual observations representing one ‘cycle’ in the productivity-inflation 
relationship, so statistical significance is difficult to achieve; and 2) the aggregate 
data may mask divergent industry-level relationships. By estimating each industry 
separately we are not forcing all the coefficients to be the same and can reveal if 
there are significant differences between industries.10 The Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression (SUR) estimation technique applied to industry level data offers the 
possibility of ameliorating some of these problems. While we will have the same 
length of data for each individual industry, the SUR method is potentially more 
efficient because it uses cross-equation information. 
4.1  Model 
Following previous practice and the insights from the literature we look at 
Granger-causality regressions with an output gap to control for the business cycle. 
Thus the basic regression estimated (explaining causation from the IPDs to 
productivity growth) is: 
  it it it it it it i it Y P P A A A ε α + + + + + + = − − − − 2 1 2 1 , (1) 
where Ait is productivity growth, Pit is the change in the implicit price deflators 
(IPDs), and Yit is the output gap, all for industry i in year t. We look at both labour 
and multifactor productivity (MFP) to shed light on the effect of inflation on 
capital accumulation. The data seem most comfortable with the inclusion of two 
lags; two lags also has the advantage of minimising the loss of degrees of freedom. 
Some of the theories discussed suggest that inflation slows the optimal 
accumulation of capital. If that is the major channel transmitting inflation’s effects 
into productivity growth, we would expect to see a relationship between inflation 
and labour productivity but not between inflation and multifactor productivity 
(which takes account of capital accumulation) – this explanation does not hold, as 
Section 5 reveals. We explore this angle more fully in Section 7. 
                                           
10 For example, each industry will probably have a different correlation with the aggregate 
business cycle. 10 
 
4.2  Data11 
Australian data are more problematic than those available for the G7 studies we are 
trying to replicate. Unlike the series dating from WWII available to other studies, 
the Australian data needed to calculate productivity measures become complete 
only in 1966, and even this run is subject to discontinuities. 
We begin with the non-farm market-sector ANZSIC (Australia New Zealand 
Standard Industry Classification) industries. Finance and insurance is excluded 
because the necessary data only begin in 1986, which would severely limit our 
available observations. The remaining industries were not seriously affected by the 
transition from ASIC (Australian Standard Industry Classification) to ANZSIC,12 
and all have output that is relatively easy to measure.13 For each of these industries 
we constructed measures of prices, and multifactor and labour productivity, plus a 
measure of the business cycle specific to that industry. Appendix A shows the 
price and productivity variables by industry. 
Our price variables are the industry gross-value-added (GVA) implicit price 
deflators (IPDs). These are relatively straightforward to calculate, being an index 
created by dividing each industry’s nominal GVA by its real GVA. As these are 
measures based on value added they can be affected by changes in input prices as 
well as output prices. Nonetheless, the IPDs represent the specific price 
environment an industry faces in the course of its business.14 
                                           
11 Through the course of this study we introduce other variables to test the robustness of our 
model and to explore the transmission mechanism between inflation and productivity growth. 
We discuss these series as they appear. 
12 To ensure we had enough observations, some ‘industries’ had to be re-aggregated after the 
ABS (Australian Bureau of Statistics) disaggregated them – for example – transport & storage 
from communications when it shifted from ASIC to ANZSIC. 
13  These industry sectors are mining, manufacturing, electricity gas & water (‘utilities’), 
construction, wholesale & retail trade, and transport, storage & communications. Although 
several of these series are available in a less aggregated form from the early 1980s (transport 
& storage separates from communications, as does wholesale from retail trade later), 
maximising our number of observations is important and given the SUR model does not 
adjust for unbalanced data, we keep these series aggregated through our full sample. 
14 We examine the correlation between industry and these aggregate price measures and what 
this might suggest in Section 5.2. 11 
 
Labour productivity is also a relatively clean calculation – in particular, it is free of 
capital measurement issues. We calculate it by dividing an industry’s real GVA 
with the total number of hours worked in that industry. Total hours were calculated 
by multiplying the year-to-August average weekly number of hours worked (for 
both full- and part-time employees, that includes, in particular, overtime and 
strikes) by the year-to-August average total number of people employed in that 
industry.15 
More complex is multifactor productivity. Here we followed a standard Solow 
growth accounting framework, which treats productivity growth as the residual of 
output growth after growth of labour and capital input are accounted for. Thus: 
  it it it it it it L K Y MFP β α − − =  (2) 
where all terms are expressed in year t for industry i as annual percentage changes, 
Y is industry i’s real GVA, α and β are the factor share of income attributable to 
capital and labour respectively, L is labour input, and K is capital input. The 
income shares were calculated by dividing an unpublished ABS series of industry-
level capital rental on the productive capital stock16 with industry nominal GVA. 
Labour’s share of income is the complement of capital’s share.17 The capital input 
measure comes from the ABS’s experimental ‘capital services’ index, which 
accounts for productive capacity of capital, making it more appealing than the 
standard capital stock measure. Labour input is the total hours worked series 
calculated for the labour productivity measure. 
To absorb the business cycle component of our data, we need a measure of each 
industry’s output gap. We generate this by subtracting a Hodrick-Prescott filter 
                                           
15 Both these series are sourced from the ABS’s Labour Force Survey. The ABS recommends 
use of this source over the alternatives, at least for total employment (ABS Cat No 6248.0). 
16 We are grateful to the Capital, Production and Deflators section of the ABS for providing 
these data. 
17 The calculated capital shares are highly plausible. For example, mining has a high capital 
share of income (66 per cent on average for 1965–2002) while construction has a low capital 
share (1965–2002 average of 19 per cent). 12 
 
generated trend of logged industry GVA growth from the same output measure.18 
These gaps are plotted in Figure B1. For reference, they are plotted against an 
aggregate non-farm output gap series (generated in Gruen, Robinson and 
Stone (2002)). While there is discussion in the literature about whether the 
HP filter is the most appropriate output gap measure, it is the most feasible one in 
our case. It also manages to control for the regular feature that productivity is 
higher in booms and lower in recessions due to problems with the measurement of 
work intensity. Further, when we augmented our model with other business cycle 
measures, they were not significant.19 
For completeness, we must mention some caveats about our data. These caveats 
are typical of any study using longer-term Australian macroeconomic data. As 
there is no consistent measure of nominal or real GVA from 1966 to 2002 both 
GVA series had to be generated. The shift from SNA68 to SNA93 in the early 
1990s is the most important break; the change from ASIC to ANZSIC around the 
same time is far less important. To overcome this break, we use the full length of 
the latest dataset and splice the early series onto years prior to 1975 for real GVA 
and 1989 for nominal GVA.20 Likewise, some of our later series combine 
disaggregated series. We simply aggregate additively or by using a weighted 
average of the two sub-series where appropriate. 
The second caveat is that any series generated from gross-value-added suffers 
issues related to the inclusion of taxes and subsidies. In calculating GVA, the ABS 
currently excludes taxes and subsidies on output but includes the taxes and 
subsidies in production; however, the rental estimates include taxes and subsidies 
on output. This is inconsistent, but not fatally so given the length of our study 
(Simon and Wardrop 2002). 
                                           
18 We set the smoothing parameter to 100, as is standard practice for an annual series. We 
reduced the end-point problem at the start of our series by applying the HP filter to industry 
GVA from 1965, while the data analysed starts in 1967. 
19 Discussed in Section 6.2. 
20 There are two years of overlap between the new and old real GVA series. So, in splicing the 
series together, we used the average ratio of the two series across these two years. 13 
 
4.3  Stationarity 
A critique made of earlier studies correlating productivity growth with inflation is 
that the two series are of different orders of integration. Specifically, these papers 
argue that inflation is I(1), whereas productivity growth is stationary. Here we 
check our series using Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests. Table 3 indicates 
that non-stationarity would not seem to be a problem for our study.  
Table 3: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Results 
Reject null hypothesis of non-stationarity 
  IPDs   Labour productivity  MFP 
Mining Yes**  Yes**  Yes** 
Manufacturing Yes**  Yes**  Yes** 
Utilities Yes**  Yes**  Yes** 
Construction Yes**  Yes**  Yes** 
Wholesale & retail trade   No  Yes**  Yes** 
Transport, storage & 
communications   No  Yes**  Yes** 
Note:  ** indicate the result’s significance at the 5 per cent levels. 
 
We see that only for wholesale & retail trade and transport, storage & 
communications do we fail to reject that the IPD is I(1). A range of factors lead us 
to treat all series as I(0): the weight of evidence from the other industries; our 
economic priors (that inflation is I(0), potentially with breaks); the tendency of 
the ADF test to under-reject the null hypothesis; and, our caution regarding the 
series for the transport, storage & communications industry group (discussed in 
Section 5). 
5.  Results 
Table 4 presents our core results for the effect of growth in the IPDs on 
productivity growth. The results in the opposite direction are not the focus of this 
paper but are reported and discussed in Appendix E. Here we have suppressed the 
results for the output gap – the coefficients are uniformly significant and of the 
expected (positive) sign. While our interest lies in the sign and significance of any 
relationship, not the numerical value of the actual coefficients, an example of the 14 
 
output from a complete system of equations is reproduced in Appendix C.21 
Table 4 also reports the R
2 for each equation within the SURs. A plot of 
residuals from the IPDs to labour productivity regressions are presented in 
Figure D1, the residuals from the MFP regressions were not appreciably different. 
Table 4: Productivity Growth and Inflation Model 
IPDs causal effect on industry productivity growth, with two lags on 
price and productivity variables: 1967–2002 
  From IPDs to 
labour productivity 
  From IPDs to 
multifactor productivity 
 Coefficient  R
2   Coefficient  R
2 
Mining  –** 0.45    –** 0.41 
Manufacturing   0  0.08      0  0.25 
Utilities  –** 0.20      0  0.39 
Construction +**  0.26      +*  0.20 
Wholesale & retail trade  –** 0.46    –** 0.47 
Transport, storage 
& communications   0  0.21    0  0.30 
Average relationship
(a)  –** 0.88      –* 0.95 
Aggregate relationship
(b)   0  0.42     0  0.37 
Notes:  Number of observations = 34; number of parameters = 5. 
  (a) We calculate this ‘average’ result for the industry-level productivity growth and prices models using a
  cross-sectional estimate, described in Pesaran and Smith (1995). 
 (b)  The  ‘aggregate’ result is a straightforward Ordinary Least Squares estimate of the model with the
  changes of the GDP deflator and aggregate labour and multifactor productivity substituted for the
  industry price and productivity measures. 
 
Table 4 presents the results of two tests, as do all the following tables reporting 
results from the various models. The first test asks whether the lagged independent 
coefficients sum to a sign significant at the 10 per cent confidence level. The signs 
report these results, with a zero indicating the coefficients have no significant 
sign.22 The second test is the traditional Granger causality test of the joint 
                                           
21 Results from the complete estimates of the other equations are available upon request from 
the authors. 
22 The simple t-test is 0 : 2 1 0 = + β β H , where  1 β  and  2 β  are the coefficients on the lags of the 
explanatory variable (e.g., in the equations using the IPDs to explain productivity growth, the 
first and second lags of the IPDs). 15 
 
significance of the coefficients on the lags of the explanatory variable, with * and 
** indicating significance at the 10 per cent and 5 per cent levels, respectively.23 
The first group of results in Table 4 describes the SUR estimates of the industry-
level relationship. These results are followed by the cross-sectional estimate, which 
is an unbiased means of observing the ‘average’ relationship across our six 
industries. The aggregate (i.e., whole economy) relationship is the final reported 
result. We discuss these aggregate models and their results further in Section 7.3. 
It is clear from these results that the aggregate pattern hides some divergent 
industry level results. We find many significant results with the majority showing a 
negative relationship, although the construction industry is an exception. The 
results for MFP confirm this pattern in labour productivity with some marginal 
differences. 
Results for causal flow in the ‘reverse’ causal direction differ between labour 
productivity and MFP. With labour productivity there is little evidence of any 
significant ‘causation’ from productivity to inflation and, thus, we can be confident 
of the results. For MFP there is a more perplexing relationship – faster MFP 
growth now appears to cause higher prices in the next two years. This is not the 
expected relationship and certainly doesn’t square with the predominantly negative 
relationship seen in Table 4 or the theoretical priors. We examine this in more 
detail in Appendix E but, for now, leave its interpretation open. Given this, one 
may want to treat the MFP results with more caution.24 
The results for the industry group of transport, storage & communications are 
insignificant for the causal flow from prices to productivity growth. The parameter 
estimates for this case are consistently insignificant in the various regressions we 
run. While we do not fully understand why this is the case, the explanation may 
partly lie in this industry group being composed of two very different sectors – 
communications (controlled by a government-owned monopoly for most of our 
sample) and transport & storage. Table 6, which summarises the industries’ 
                                           
23 This F-test’s nul hypothesis is:  0 : 2 1 0 = = β β H . 
24  However, if anything, this confirms the finding that lower inflation leads to higher 
productivity  – reverse causality is not the reason for our inflation to productivity story 
because it is of the wrong sign. 16 
 
structures, gives some indication of the extent of these differences. The 
productivity-inflation relationship may behave differently in these sectors, leading 
us to find no significant relationship across the industry group as a whole. 
Disaggregated series for these sectors are only available from 1981, meaning there 
is little scope to get statistically meaningful results from the disaggregated series. 
5.1  Considering the Results in More Depth 
While we have used industry inflation in our regressions it may be that each 
industry is merely responding to aggregate inflation as proxied by the industry 
inflation series. Our industry-level price measures must all contain some element 
of aggregate inflation. Table 5 reports the IPDs’ contemporaneous correlation with 
the aggregate price measures of the GDP deflator and CPI inflation through the full 
sample. 
Table 5: Correlation of the IPDs and Aggregate Inflation Measures 
IPD  GDP deflator  CPI inflation 
Mining 0.55  0.49 
Manufacturing 0.83  0.77 
Utilities 0.54  0.57 
Construction 0.74  0.76 
Wholesale & retail trade  0.63  0.68 
Transport, storage 
& communications  0.76 0.65 
Note:  ‘GDP deflator’ is annual percentage change in the non-farm GDP deflator. 
 
As expected, most of the IPDs’ movements are common across the economy. 
Further testing, however, indicates that industry deflators are to be preferred to the 
aggregate deflator. Aggregate inflation (measured by the GDP deflator) is 
uniformly insignificant when added to our equations. When we substitute CPI 
inflation or changes in the GDP deflator for the IPDs in our model, neither 
performs at all well at predicting productivity growth.25 This is useful information. 
These results indicate that the industry-specific component of the IPDs seems to 
matter more for an industry’s productivity growth than aggregate inflation. 
                                           
25 The GDP deflator performs less poorly, as is expected given its slightly higher correlation 
with the IPDs. Reassuringly, both are good predictors of the IPDs. 17 
 
Returning to the issue of why the sign of causation from inflation to productivity 
growth diverges between industries, we look more closely at how the industries 
differ. One of the simplest means of understanding how industries differ is asking 
how production in that industry is organised – in particular, whether it is 
dominated by small or large firms. Of course there are other ways in which the 
industries differ, but given limited data this seems to best help us understand our 
results. 
Table 6 summarises the most relevant measures. We present the N-firm 
concentration ratio for an industry – the proportion of gross-value-added produced 
by the largest N firms – and information on the 1
st and 9
th deciles for firm income 
and sales. Note, these measures do not impose any priors about how these firms 
competitively interact in the market; rather they all observe the industry structure 
at the level of the firm qua autonomous economic agent. 
Table 6: Industry Structure 
Firm size characteristics by industry 








Firm income ($’000)    Firm sales ($’000) 












Communications 0.95  0.96  na    na     na    na 
Mining  0.32  0.56  150  25 126    130  25 753 
Utilities  0.18  0.56  na    na     na    na 
Transport 
& storage  0.28 0.46    47    1  422    48    1  503 
Wholesale & 
retail trade  0.14 0.21  100    4  484    89    4  194 
Manufacturing  0.07  0.19  66    4  064     60    3  540 
Construction  0.04  0.17  37    1  222     43    1  282 
Notes:  (a) A similar measure of concentration for the largest 12 and 25 firms in an industry is available for the
start of our sample. It suggests that the rankings in 1969 were not too different from those reported here. 
Sources:  ABS; Industry Commission and Department of Industry, Science and Tourism (1997). Concentration
ratios are an average of the ratios for 1998/99 and 1999/00 published by the ABS. The income and sales
distribution data was collected in the 1995 wave of the Business Longitudinal Survey. 
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We see a consistent picture here. Large firms appear to be more important in 
mining, utilities and trade than in manufacturing and construction. Both the 
smallest and the largest firms are smaller in manufacturing and construction than in 
wholesale and retail trade, utilities and mining. Likewise, the largest 4, or 20, firms 
are responsible for a smaller proportion of an industry’s output in these least 
concentrated industries. This pattern of industrial structure correlates with the signs 
in our results for the inflation-productivity growth relationship.26 
Our results show a break in the sign of the inflation-productivity growth 
relationship, from the negative relationship observed in the mining, utilities and 
wholesale & retail trade industries, to the insignificant relationship observed in the 
manufacturing industry, to the positive relationship observed in construction. At 
the same point, there is an observable shift in the industry structure, albeit not a 
clear break. Those industries where large firms play a more important role reported 
a negative relationship. Contrast construction where the relationship was positive: 
small firms appear to be relatively more important in the construction industry. In 
between lies manufacturing, where no significant relationship was observed, and 
where small firms play an intermediate role in producing the industry’s output. 
We hypothesise that observed sign differences may reflect compositional effects 
within the industries. Specifically, in the concentrated industries we would not 
expect much change amongst the firms in business. Thus, inflation’s observed 
effect on productivity growth probably reflects within-firm effects. On the other 
hand, we would expect much higher rates of firm bankruptcy and formation in 
industries where small firms play a larger role. So the differences in results may 
reflect compositional differences between the industries. We explore this idea 
further in Section 7.2. 
                                           
26 Note that transport & storage is disaggregated from communications in Table 6. This is 
intended to illustrate the differences in these industries, and particularly to highlight that while 
communications is dominated by one firm, transport & storage is one of the less concentrated 
industries. Its firms are similar in size (as measured by the 1
st and 9
th deciles) to those in 
construction, another low-concentration industry. This is likely to indicate why we do not 
observe a strongly significant inflation-productivity growth relationship when we aggregate 
these industries together. 19 
 
This section presented our core results. We analyse them in Section 7 after 
considering their robustness in the next section; the reader less concerned with 
iterations of the results may proceed directly to Section 7. 
6.  Robustness 
There are two principle ways we test our findings’ robustness: one splits the 
sample; the other includes additional control variables that may substitute for 
inflation in the productivity-inflation relationship. The test is whether a significant 
relationship remains despite including these alternative controls. There are a 
number of factors that limit the testing we can do. First, we have limited 
observations: 34 in the full sample, 17 when we split it, leaving 9 degrees of 
freedom if we include alternative controls in the sub-samples. Second, we are 
estimating this system over six industries, across three periods, using two measures 
of productivity growth, so we would expect some of our results to be incorrect 
when applying a 10 per cent confidence level. These considerations mean we use 
the following discussion to suggest where the weight of evidence lies rather than 
focusing on individual results. 
6.1  Robustness to Sample Period 
First we assess the relationship’s robustness across different periods. The 
Australian inflation-productivity growth experience is unlike those of the G7 
countries studied elsewhere as productivity growth does not slow until the 1980s 
(see Table 1). Yet the relationship remains when limited to observations over 
different samples (Table 7). 
When the sample is split only 12 degrees of freedom remain, and this is likely to 
have a non-trivial effect on the significance of our results. Furthermore, there is 
less variation in inflation in the post 1986 sample and, correspondingly, relatively 
more noise. Nonetheless, where the sub-sample results are significant, they are 
generally of the same sign as the full sample results. 20 
 
Table 7: Productivity Growth and Inflation Model: Robustness Tests 
Relationship between IPDs and industry productivity growth 
IPDs to labour productivity model:  
it it it it it it i it Y P P A A A ε β β β β β α + + + + + + = − − − − 5 2 4 1 3 2 2 1 1 , 
where A is labour productivity growth 
  1967–2002    Pre-1986 sample    Post-1985 sample 
 Coefficient  R
2   Coefficient  R
2   Coefficient  R
2 
Mining   –** 0.45     –** 0.68      +**  0.69 
Manufacturing 0  0.08    0  0.29    0  0.32 
Utilities   –** 0.20     –** 0.43    0  0.09 
Construction   +**  0.26      +**  0.64    0  0.13 
Wholesale & 
retail trade    –** 0.46     –** 0.75     –** 0.59 
Transport, storage 
& communications  0 0.21    0 0.53    0 0.39 
IPDs to multifactor productivity model: 
it it it it it it i it Y P P A A A ε β β β β β α + + + + + + = − − − − 5 2 4 1 3 2 2 1 1 , 
where A is MFP growth 
  1967–2002   Pre-1986  sample  Post-1985  sample 
 Coefficient  R
2   Coefficient  R
2   Coefficient  R
2 
Mining   –** 0.41      –** 0.39    0  0.69 
Manufacturing 0  0.25      0  0.36    0  0.44 
Utilities   0  0.39      –** 0.58    0  0.61 
Construction   +*  0.20      +**  0.68    0  0.28 
Wholesale & 
retail trade    –** 0.47    0  0.72     –** 0.54 
Transport, storage 
& communications   0  0.30    0  0.62    0 0.31 
Notes:  Like Table 4, this table contains the results from two tests. The signs indicate whether the lagged
independent coefficients sum to a sign significant at the 10 per cent confidence level. A 0 indicates the 
coefficients have no determinable sign. * and ** represent the results from the conventional Granger
causality tests, on the joint significance of the lagged coefficients. * and ** indicate the relevant lagged
explanators are jointly significant at the 10 per cent and 5 per cent levels, respectively. 
  Number of observations: full sample = 34; pre-1986 sample = 17; post-1985 sample = 17. 
  Number of parameters = 5. 
 21 
 
6.2  Robustness to Additional Control Variables 
Other variables may be more closely related to productivity growth than inflation, 
and hence reduce the significance in our model. There are three groups of possible 
variables other than inflation that we consider. The first group focuses on the 
uncertainty aspect of higher inflation rates. We know higher levels of inflation are 
associated with more variance in the inflation rate,27 hence with greater cyclical 
volatility (Blanchard and Simon 2001). Perhaps a range of variables measuring 
output and aggregate inflation variability would also predict productivity growth. 
A second group of variables focuses on the business cycle aspect of inflation. The 
final group looks at agents’ predictions of aggregate inflation, with the premise that 
agents determine their behaviour more by these than the actual inflation outcomes. 
Returning to first principles, the primary role of prices is as an efficient means of 
transmitting information about relative supply and demand conditions in diverse 
parts of the economy. By definition, inflation is a period of rising prices. But prices 
generally do not rise smoothly; instead, there is an iterated process of prices 
jumping levels. These changes do not necessarily happen in a coordinated or 
consistent way. And therein lies the problem for agents. Because the relative prices 
of a firm’s inputs and outputs change faster during inflations, the firm has to be 
able to distinguish between a change in relative scarcities and a rise in the overall 
price level. Thus the firm’s essential function of determining optimal input and 
output combinations becomes more complex. 
We can test this theory and observe whether it offsets the IPDs’ role in explaining 
productivity growth in a variety of ways. One approach is to focus on the effects of 
uncertainty in general. To do this we treat uncertainty and volatility as 
synonymous. We can observe the relationship between productivity growth and 
variability in real output, the CPI, and inflation expectations as measured by the 
Economic Group Bond Market Inflation Expectations series and by the Melbourne 
Institute-Westpac inflation expectations survey. ‘Variability’ is measured in two 
ways: the standard deviation of the quarterly data across a window of the previous 
5 years, and as the error in the predicted level of the variable from an 
                                           
27  There is a succession of important papers on this point, dating from Okun (1971); 
Taylor (1981) is a classic reference. 22 
 
autoregressive model, run from 9–16 quarters prior to time t.28 We chose the 
2-year lag between the autoregressive system and the actual inflation outcome to 
approximate the lead-time between a business decision (e.g., investment in a new 
technology or organisational structure) and its appearance in the firm’s 
productivity performance. 
Over the full sample, the only consistent effect of including the standard deviation 
of the GDP deflator, CPI inflation and bond market inflation expectations is to 
make the standard errors of our Granger causality coefficients larger, but generally 
not so as to make the IPDs insignificant. This outcome is not unexpected given 
adding these variables means two more parameters are being estimated, hence 2 
fewer degrees of freedom are available. The coefficients of the alternative 
variables are generally insignificant, with parameter estimates varying widely as 
different lags are included in the estimates. The best performing addition is the 
standard deviation of the GDP deflator,29 but it shared the other variables’ inability 
to perform better than the IPDs at explaining productivity growth. For example, 
CPI inflation’s standard deviation only significantly explained productivity growth 
in the utilities equation. The autoregressive CPI predictions based on past CPI 
inflation and bond market inflation expectations were even less effective in our 
models.30 In sum, the IPDs consistently outperform intuitively sensible alternatives 
at explaining productivity growth.31 
A criticism of earlier studies is that they ignored cyclicality as a driver of the 
apparent prices and productivity growth relationship.32 While the model estimated 
in Table 7 does include an industry-specific output gap, some other variable may 
be more appropriate. We consider interest rates (both nominal and real), growth of 
                                           
28 Both these approaches require quarterly data, thus excluding the only annually available IPDs. 
29 This explained IPD growth in the productivity-to-prices equations (see Appendix E) for 
mining, manufacturing and utilities at the 5 per cent confidence level, which tells us that 
higher IPDs are associated with greater volatility in the aggregate inflation measures – not a 
remarkable result. 
30 This result does not imply that uncertainty does not play a role in inflation’s effect on 
productivity growth. Instead, this merely indicates that we have not been able to locate a 
better proxy for this uncertainty than our IPDs. 
31 All of these results are available upon request from the authors. 
32 See especially Sbordone and Kuttner (1994). 23 
 
industry and aggregate value added, and the change in the ratio of capital to labour 
inputs. None of these emerge as significant.33 
In summary, the model seems to pass the robustness tests as well as could be 
expected given the limitations created by the number of observations. Our results 
suggest that, at the least, something that is highly correlated with inflation causes 
changes in the rate of productivity growth.34 Furthermore, this is something that 
has remained correlated through some quite substantial monetary policy regime 
changes. Section 7 proceeds on the basis that inflation is, in fact, causing the 
changes in productivity growth. On these foundations, it suggests a means of tying 
down the transmission mechanism, building on insights from the various 
industries’ differing experiences. 
7.  Discussion 
Section 5 found a significant causal flow from inflation to productivity growth that 
varied by industry. Section 6 established that this finding is reasonably robust. This 
section discusses our results by expanding on some of the issues up to now implicit 
in this paper. 
A group of arguments suggest the inflation-productivity growth nexus is all about 
capital accumulation. These effects should be revealed in differing effects of 
inflation on labour and multifactor productivity growth – we explore this first. We 
then set out the contention that the relationship is a story of comparative industrial 
structure. In particular, we focus on one aspect of industrial structure, the 
distribution of firm sizes. This comes from synthesising two observations. The first 
is that the relationship’s sign appears to correlate with the importance of small 
relative to large firms in the industry’s production. The other is that industry 
inflation, reflecting the industry environment, matters more than aggregate 
                                           
33 The exception is the change in the industries’ respective real GVA, which was significant and 
negative, but generally did not dramatically alter the IPDs’ coefficients and standard errors. 
This result is limited to the multifactor productivity growth equation. Again, all of these 
results are available upon request from the authors. 
34 A possible alternative explanator relates to variations in labour’s relative share of total output. 
However, this variable is not significant when added to our model, and does not materially 
affect the coefficients on the IPDs. Again, these results are available from the authors. 24 
 
inflation for industry productivity growth. We proffer this as a partial explanation 
of our results – other, unobserved, factors also undoubtedly play a role. We 
conclude this section by searching for alternative means of understanding this 
relationship, but a lack of data frustrates this inquiry. 
7.1  Capital Accumulation 
Inflation’s output costs are often traced to its effect on capital accumulation. 
Specifically, it is argued that sub-optimal levels of capital investment arise from 
the distorting effects of taxation on capital income, with this fiscal distortion 
accentuated by its interaction with monetary policy.35 A similar argument is found 
in references to inflation’s confounding effect on the ‘organisation of markets’, 
particularly markets for financial assets and savings, leading to capital being less 
efficiently allocated. 
The inflation-productivity growth literature evokes these arguments to explain the 
observed decline of labour productivity growth as price growth accelerates.36 We 
can test whether this contention is correct by observing the relationship between 
inflation and multifactor productivity growth. As multifactor productivity measures 
output per unit of both labour and capital input, it is ‘net’ of the effects of a slower 
accumulation of capital per worker.37 To simplify, if inflation only affects labour 
productivity growth, then slower capital accumulation is the likely explanation for 
the inflation-productivity nexus; but if inflation also affects multifactor 
productivity growth, at least part of the explanation lies elsewhere. 
We do not find evidence that supports the capital story. When we ask inflation to 
explain both multifactor and labour productivity growth, our results are highly 
similar for multifactor productivity growth – recall Table 4. Higher inflation means 
                                           
35 Feldstein outlines a number of inter-related routes through which inflation interacts with 
capital accumulation: 
Inflation distorts the measurement of profits, of interest payments, and of capital gains. The 
resulting mismeasurement…cause[s] a substantial increase in the effective tax rate on the real 
income from capital employed in the nonfinancial corporate sector. (Feldstein 1982a, p 153) 
36 Recall from Table 2 that the bulk of the studies only measure productivity in terms of output 
per unit of labour input, and do not also correlate inflation with multifactor productivity 
growth. 
37 For exactness, recall that our labour input measures are not employment levels but total hours 
worked. 25 
 
slower output growth per unit of labour input and capital input. That there is some 
shifting of significance between the labour and multifactor productivity growth 
regressions may indicate that capital possibly plays some role, but that it is far 
from primary.38 
7.2  The Role of Industrial Structure 
A range of indicators tie the productivity-inflation relationship to industry-specific 
factors – first and foremost, the results vary by industry and, also, it is industry 
price deflators that are significant in our model.39 The model’s preference for 
industry deflators over aggregate deflators tells us that our observation of inflation 
affecting productivity growth is not only repeated instances of economy-wide 
trends, but shows firms reacting to price changes in their immediate environment. 
How firms react to these changes varies by industry, as shown by the previous 
regressions results. While a range of factors differentiates the industries, we focus 
on the distribution of firm sizes in this section – in large part because this is most 
easily quantified. 
Let us first conjecture about the process within any given firm. Higher inflation 
creates a less certain environment for planning, greater cash-flow pressure, an 
increase in real investment in inventories, delays in account payments and greater 
bad debts from insolvent debtors. These increased costs of monitoring agents and 
managing production processes would all be expected to reduce productivity levels 
and lead to less scope for implementing ongoing improvements to productivity. In 
larger firms the problems might be expected to be greater. The larger the firm, the 
more complex becomes the manager’s job. Most simply, faster price rises adds an 
extra layer of uncertainty, so thwarting their task. 
The way this general reduction in efficiency translates to industry-wide findings 
depends on compositional effects. In industries dominated by large firms we would 
expect there to be minimal compositional effects and, thus, that the within firm 
effects would also be reflected at the industry level. This is consistent with our 
                                           
38 In addition, growth of capital services is not statistically significant in our model, although it 
visually seems to lead the productivity measures by 2–3 years. Finally, neither the real nor the 
nominal interest rate sits significantly in our model. 
39 At this point, it is useful to review Tables 4, 5 and 6. 26 
 
finding that higher inflation Granger-causes slower productivity growth in the 
more concentrated industries. There are few compositional effects obscuring the 
basic effect and we can be fairly confident that the industry relationships also 
reflect firm level relationships. In less concentrated industries with more small 
firms, compositional effects become more important. 
Among smaller firms, churning – i.e., entry and exit of firms – is greater.40 Firm 
size and failure risk are negatively related, and so we would expect a higher 
incidence of insolvency in industries that are less concentrated and have smaller 
firms on average. We also know that the least efficient firms are the most 
susceptible to insolvency.41 Bringing these observations together, we conjecture 
that higher inflation pushes small low-efficiency firms out of business. Inefficient 
firms are more likely to fail and small firms have less reserves to see them through 
hard times. The compositional change resulting from this ‘cull of the slowest’ 
could then lift the average productivity level for those industries where small firms 
are responsible for a larger proportion of output. This might still imply a negative 
effect on productivity at the aggregate level to the extent that the affected industry 
is reduced below its efficient size. 
7.3  The Aggregate Effect 
The preceding work has used the industry level results to gain a richer 
understanding of the inflation-productivity relationship. Nonetheless, one may still 
be interested in the average effect. The aggregate results alluded to in the 
introduction and presented in Table 4 are one way of looking at this. 
At the aggregate level, Granger causality tests suggest that there may be a negative 
relationship at the 10 per cent level of significance.42 An alternative is to look at 
cross-sectional and mean group estimates. We follow Pesaran and Smith (1995) in 
                                           
40 On the Australian relationship, see e.g., Bickerdyke, Lattimore and Madge (2000); on the 
relationship across the OECD economies excluding Australia, see e.g., Scarpetta et al (2002). 
41 Both Bickerdyke et al (2000) and Scarpetta et al (2002) provide empirical evidence that 
insolvency risk increases as efficiency declines. 
42 While the lags of inflation are jointly significant (p-values of 0.07 and 0.05 for labour and 
multifactor productivity growth, respectively), the sum of the lags is negative but is not 
statistically different from zero. For brevity, the entire model and results are not reported here, 
but are available upon request. 27 
 
calculating consistent estimates of the average effect. The mean group estimate, 
which involves averaging the individual industry estimates, shows a negative but 
insignificant average relationship. The cross-sectional regression finds a negative 
and significant average relationship.43 Thus, there is general agreement across the 
three methods about the average effect – inflation broadly leads to reduced 
productivity growth. 
Some issues remain open in the work above. We focus on one particular difference 
between industries. There are others we have not accounted for and that must also 
influence the prices-productivity growth relationship. More fundamentally, this 
paper has not specifically addressed the longer run dynamics of the inflation-
productivity nexus. It cannot distinguish between a sustained acceleration in 
productivity growth and a shift in the level of productivity distributed over a period 
of time. Thus, while we expect that the ‘between-firm’ effect will dissipate in the 
medium- to long-run, we do not have the data to conclusively prove this. 
8. Conclusion 
This paper has explored the relationship between inflation and productivity growth. 
Using measures of productivity and inflation for single-digit Australian market-
sector industries, we find a statistically significant relationship between these 
variables. After accounting for the business cycle, we argue that what seems to 
matter for productivity outcomes is economic agents’ immediate inflationary 
environments. In particular, industry inflation appears more important in 
explaining productivity than aggregate inflation. Also, the distribution of firms of 
different sizes in an industry seems to matter. 
Taken together, the results are consistent with international evidence of a negative 
relationship between inflation and productivity growth. Hence they suggest that a 
part of the productivity slowdown of the 1970s and its acceleration in the 1990s 
can be attributed to the rise and fall of inflation, though undoubtedly other factors 
were also at work. They also suggest that it is important to consider industry level 
forces when analysing the aggregate trends. 
                                           
43 The full details of these regressions are available on request. 28 
 
Appendix A: Industry Productivity and Price Series 
Figure A1: Mining Price and Productivity Measures 
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Figure A2: Manufacturing Price and Productivity Measures 


























Sources: ABS;  authors’ calculations 
Figure A3: Utilities Price and Productivity Measures 
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Figure A4: Construction Price and Productivity Measures 
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Figure A5: Wholesale and Retail Trade Price and Productivity Measures 
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Figure A6: Transport, Storage and Communications Price 
and Productivity Measures 
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Appendix B: Output Gap Series 
Figure B1: Output Gap Series 
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Appendix C: Sample Estimation Results 
Table C1: Sample Estimate Results 
Coefficients for IPDs to labour productivity growth equation 














































































2  0.45 0.08 0.20  0.26 0.46  0.21 
Notes:  Standard errors are reported in parantheses. 
 Dependent  variable:  At, where A is labour productivity growth. 
  Number of observations = 34; number of parameters = 5. 
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Appendix D: Residuals of Inflation to Productivity Growth Model 
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Appendix E: Reverse Causal Flow 
Table 4 presented the results for the model of inflation’s effect on productivity 
growth. Table E1 reports the results for the reverse direction of productivity’s 
effects on inflation. 
Table E1: Productivity Growth to Inflation Model 
Industry productivity growth’s causal effect on IPDs, with two lags on price and 
productivity variables: 1967–2002 
  From labour 
productivity to IPDs 
 From  multifactor 
productivity to IPDs 
 Coefficient  R
2   Coefficient  R
2 
Mining 0  0.20    0  0.19 
Manufacturing +  0.42      +**  0.55 
Utilities 0  0.38      +*  0.46 
Construction 0  0.10      +*  0.12 
Wholesale & 
retail trade   +*  0.52    +**  0.54 
Transport, storage 
& communications  0 0.31    +**  0.37 
Notes:  Number of observations = 34; number of parameters = 5. 
 
We see that there is little relationship for labour productivity but a predominant 
positive effect from MFP to inflation. Intuitively this doesn’t make a lot of sense 
and it is also at odds with the results that show higher inflation causing lower 
productivity. Nonetheless, following an idea from Lowe (1995) we consider 
whether this may reflect the operation of a third, omitted factor: wages. Lowe 
argues that higher nominal wage growth is associated with faster productivity 
growth, and conversely that when an industry’s real product wages44 fall, that 
industry’s labour productivity will also fall as it employs more workers, 
particularly more marginal workers. Further, Lowe argues nominal wages should 
                                           
44 Lowe (1995) defines real product wages as nominal wage growth deflated by the IPD. 
For clarity, contrast this with real consumption wages, which are nominal wages deflated 
by the CPI – Lowe (1995) argues this version of wages should not effect employment, hence 
productivity. 36 
 
also explain the IPDs. For this reason we re-estimate the model reported in 
Table E1 with an added wages measure.45 
Our measure of wage growth excludes the cyclical elements of employee 
compensation, such as overtime payments and bonuses.46 At risk of stating a 
truism, these cyclical elements are closely correlated with the business cycle in a 
way that is different from the underlying growth in wages. For example, hourly 
overtime rates are greater than ordinary time rates, which means faster than 
underlying growth in hourly wages during upswings when more overtime hours are 
worked. We wish to assess the hypothesis that productivity growth affects 
underlying wage growth, which in turn drives the IPDs, not simply the story that 
wage growth explains the industry IPDs through cyclical co-movement. And so it 
is important that the wage growth measure we use only incorporates the 
productivity-related part of wage growth, and is ‘cleaned’ of the purely cyclical 
elements. 
Adding wage growth to our model of productivity growth’s effect on price growth 
has only a marginal effect on the productivity growth coefficients, although the 
wage growth coefficients are uniformly of the expected sign and significant in all 
but one equation. Table E2 reports the results of interest.47 
The wage growth coefficient is significant in all but one equation and of the 
expected sign. However, adding wage growth has only a marginal effect on the 
                                           
45 Madsen and Damania (2001) find empirical support for a positive relationship between wages 
and productivity in OECD countries. 
46 The measure used is the growth in average weekly ordinary time earnings per hour worked, 
for full-time, non-managerial adult males in both private and public sectors, using averages 
for the year-to-August where possible. This series was the only wage information running the 
full length of our productivity series clean of business cycle variations. 
  There is an alternative labour compensation measure, namely the labour income measure in 
the national accounts. Although this measure also runs the full length of the sample, it has two 
disadvantages: a) it does not fully remove the cyclical component of employee compensation 
(e.g., bonuses, overtime payments, etc); and b) the series is used to calculate industry GVA 
and hence is highly correlated with the productivity measures. An independently calculated 
series seems preferable. 
47 When included in the equations explaining productivity growth, the sign on wages is less well 
behaved and appears to have a less determined effect on the lagged IPD coefficients. This is 
not inconsistent with Lowe’s (1995) thesis. (Results are available upon request from the 
authors.) 37 
 
labour productivity and multifactor productivity growth equations. For labour 
productivity there was not much of a relationship to start with so this is 
unremarkable. For MFP it shows that the problem remains. 
Table E2: Productivity Growth and Inflation Model with Wages’ Growth 
Relationship between IPDs and industry productivity growth with ordinary time 
wage growth: 1967–2002 
Labour productivity to IPDs model: 
it it it it it it it i it W Y P P A A A ε β β β β β β α + + + + + + + = − − − − − 1 6 5 2 4 1 3 2 2 1 1 , 
where A is labour productivity growth, W is growth ordinary time earnings 
Coefficient Productivity  Wages’ growth  R
2 
Mining 0  +**  0.32 
Manufacturing 0  +**  0.78 
Utilities 0  +**  0.56 
Construction 0  +**  0.56 
Wholesale & retail trade    +**  +**  0.62 
Transport, storage 
& communications  + +**  0.48 
Multifactor productivity to IPDs model: 
it it it it it it it i it W Y P P A A A ε β β β β β β α + + + + + + + = − − − − − 1 6 5 2 4 1 3 2 2 1 1 , 
where A is MFP growth, W is growth ordinary time earnings 
Coefficient Productivity  Wages’ growth  R
2 
Mining 0  +**  0.34 
Manufacturing   +**  +**  0.80 
Utilities   +** +** 0.63 
Construction 0  +**  0.56 
Wholesale & retail trade    +**  +**  0.63 
Transport, storage 
& communications   +**  +**  0.52 
Notes:  Number of observations = 34; except utilities equations where number of observations = 29. 
  Number of parameters = 6. 
  Like Table 4, this table contains the results from two tests. The signs indicate whether the lagged
independent coefficients sum to a sign significant at the 10 per cent confidence level. A 0 indicates the
coefficients have no determinable sign. * and ** represent the results from the conventional Granger
causality tests, on the joint significance of the lagged coefficients. * and ** indicate the relevant
lagged explanators are jointly significant at the 10 per cent and 5 per cent levels, respectively. 
   Utilities’ wages data only commence in 1974. As the SUR estimation does not manage unbalanced
data, the results in this table come from excluding utilities from the SUR, then running a second SUR
including utilities to observe the relationship for that sector. 38 
 
These results clearly show that wages affect inflation. However, the wages’ growth 
variable does not account for the curious causal relationship between growth in 
multifactor productivity and the IPDs. We added a range of other variables and 
tried alternative but intuitively sensible models, but were unable to explain the 
results in Table E2. Given the odd relationship predominately appears in the 
multifactor productivity growth equations, a possible explanation may be the 
measurement issues with our multifactor productivity growth series. Measuring 
multifactor productivity growth as a residual of an output function means the series 
also captures the measurement error in capital – which is especially hard to 
measure accurately – and the aggregate hours and real and nominal GVA series. 
However, this explanation is unconvincing given multifactor productivity growth 
behaved similarly to labour productivity growth in the model observing price 
growth’s effect on productivity growth. So, in sum, the results for MFP growth 
remain anomalous, and a potential area for future research. 39 
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